

7 Socialist Worldmaking: Architecture and Global Urbanization in the Cold War

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THIS CHAPTER PRESENTS the interim results of a research project that explores architectural mobilities among socialist Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the Middle East during the Cold War.¹ Against the prevailing tendency to reduce the globalization of architecture to nothing more than Westernization, this research draws attention to the contributions of architects, planners, engineers, and construction companies mobilized in state-socialist networks to worldwide urbanization processes after the Second World War. In so doing, it studies state-socialist networks bifurcating within a multiplicity of competing projects of worldwide cooperation and solidarity from the 1950s to the 1980s. By focusing on this multiplicity, this research does not simply add Moscow, Warsaw, or Belgrade to the Western centers from which architectural expertise was diffused. Rather, it replaces such a diffusionist model with a study of transactions between actors circulating in competing networks at a variety of scales and argues that such a heuristic is better suited to understanding their agency on the ground.² Consequently, rather than focusing on bilateral narratives—as Ryszard Kapuściński once quipped, “How are the Russians doing in Tanzania, [. . .] how are the Americans doing in Liberia?”³—four case studies focus on intersections of state-socialist networks with others in specific locations and at specific periods: Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah (1957–66), Nigeria between the First and the Second Republic (1966–79), Iraq from the coup of Abd al-Karim Qasim to the First Gulf War (1958–90), and Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during the last decade of the Cold War.

These case studies, explored in detail in my forthcoming book *Architecture in Global Socialism*, show how transactions across competing global networks in Ghana, Nigeria, Iraq, and the Gulf resulted in the deployment of architectural resources from socialist Europe, including construction materials and technologies, technical details and functional typologies, principles of design, images, and discourses. They also included the one resource that was both mobilized

in socialist networks and was mobilizing others namely, the labor of architects, engineers, planners, technicians, economists, administrators, educators, foremen, and workers. By following architectural labor in each of the studied locations, this research shows how differences between various networks offered opportunities and constraints to assemble, accelerate, augment, or block the deployment of architectural resources. The results of these engagements include buildings and infrastructures still in use; master plans, regulations, and norms still applied; and curricula still taught. By revisiting them, this research contributes to a more heterogeneous and antagonistic genealogy of the globalization of architecture and, more generally, of urbanization conditions around the world.

Socialist Worldmaking

The global mobility of architecture after the Second World War has been a preoccupation of architectural and planning historians over the last two decades. In particular, scholars have shown how this mobility was accelerated by colonial and postcolonial networks, those of the United States, Western Europe, and international organizations such as the United Nations, and by economic globalization since the 1970s.⁴ However, the socialist countries have been absent from this discussion until recently. Apart from the sheer difficulty of gaining access to archival sources that have often been destroyed or dispersed, this omission has been grounded in a series of conceptual decisions. In particular, they included the reduction of the worldwide mobility of architecture to the dominant narratives of “Westernization” or “Americanization,” in which the role reserved for Eastern Europe is that of a “new market” for Western firms “created” after the fall of the Berlin Wall.⁵

By uncovering the role of socialist states in global urbanization processes, this research stresses the multiplicity, rather than bipolarity, of these exchanges. The questioning of the Western genealogy of globalization does not mean a return to Cold War discourse about “the world [. . .] split into two camps: the camp of peace, democracy, and socialism, and the camp of imperialism,” as a resolution of East Germany’s Socialist Unity Party put it in 1952.⁶ Rather, the focus on global trajectories of architecture reveals differences between the political and economic interests of particular socialist countries and highlights various facets of socialist internationalism. For instance, a vital vehicle for the mobility of Yugoslavia’s architecture, planning, and construction industry were networks of the nonaligned movement (NAM, since 1961). In the 1980s it was NAM diplomacy that leveraged the Belgrade-based design and construction company Energojekt (EP) into a group of the world’s twenty largest engineering companies.⁷ Like the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1948, so too the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s further diversified the trajectories of architecture from socialist countries. The townscape of a postcolonial capital, such as Conakry in Guinea under Ahmed

Sékou Touré (1958–84), was a case in point: it reflected assistance programs from both the Soviet Union (Conakry's Polytechnic Institute, L. Afanas'ev for Gipro-vuz, 1964) and China (National Assembly Building, Chen Deng'ao and Wang Rongshou for the Beijing Design Institute, 1960s), while the master plan was delivered by Yugoslav (Croatian) planners.⁸ Competition between external powers opened a space for maneuvers much larger than the Cold War discourse about Soviet "proxies" would suggest. This concerned members of NAM in particular, with Indonesia under Sukarno (until 1967) and Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser (until 1970) being the two biggest recipients of Soviet aid, much of which was used for construction projects, sometimes against Moscow's advice.⁹

In order to capture the multiplicity and the antagonisms between architectural networks after the Second World War, I prefer to speak about the world-making (*mondialisation*) of architecture rather than about its "globalization." For Henri Lefebvre, who coined this term in the course of the 1970s, the "worldwide" (*le mondial*) was not an accomplished historical process but rather an emerging dimension of practice. Lefebvre argued that the worldwide was rendered operative in the world market, in transportation and communication technologies, in ecological threats on a planetary scale, in "right to the city" movements around the globe, and in the tendency toward complete urbanization. These latter contribute to the "worldwide experience" by conveying antagonistic practices of worldmaking—that is to say alternative visions of the world as a whole, its plural imaginations, and a variety of ways of "practicing" the world as an abstraction that is becoming "true in practice."¹⁰ Along these lines, writing by the end of the Cold War, Martinican writer, poet, and theorist Édouard Glissant defined the world not by the logics of expansion but by the multiplication of possibilities of connection.¹¹ Following both authors, I insist on the difference between worldmaking and "globalization": the US-backed, global spread of economic and political phenomena since the 1970s known to Anglophone readers as "globalization" is to be seen as just one among many possibilities of worldmaking.¹²

Socialism offered other such possibilities: while the global dimension of socialism was explicitly present in the movement since its beginnings in the nineteenth century, after the emergence of the Soviet state and in particular after the Second World War, socialism became a global phenomenon conveyed by the political culture of socialist states and their geopolitical strategies and myths.¹³ Architectural networks from socialist countries need to be seen as part of this global dimension of socialism, and their bifurcations reflected the worldmaking dynamics in play.

In Lefebvre's writings, worldmaking is an inchoate concept and hence each usage must be tailored to suit the case study in question. The first case study of this research project addresses the Soviet claim to the global applicability of the socialist model of development by focusing on the work of Soviet architects and

engineers in Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana. Yet the application of this model did not exhaust the foreign engagements of Eastern European architects, engineers, planners, and contractors. Rather than referring to a global vision of socialist development, Hungarian, Polish, and Yugoslav architects working in Nigeria (1966–79) proposed a different type of commonality. It was based on the “worlding” of Eastern Europe, or the sharing of the Eastern European historical experience of overcoming cultural dependence and economic exploitation with the whole (Third) world. In countries that embarked on a noncapitalist (but not necessarily socialist) path of development, architects from Eastern Europe worked within what Soviet economists called the “World Socialist System,” or a framework of global trade that was formulated by socialist countries in response to the bifurcations of socialisms during the 1960s. In so doing, these actors took advantage of the differences between the political economy of foreign trade in state socialism and the emerging, Western-dominated international market of design and construction services as the case study of Iraq shows (1958–90). The focus on Kuwait and the UAE (1979–90) allows us to retrace the integration of some actors from socialist countries into this increasingly globalized market. This integration, which I call “socialist globalization,” was based on the previous experience of two decades of collaboration with Arab clients within the networks of socialist internationalism.

The socialist model of development, the worlding of Eastern Europe, the world socialist system, and socialist globalization were four historically specific instances of socialist worldmaking that both informed and were informed by the mobilities of architecture from socialist Eastern Europe. Before summarizing the ways in which the dynamics of worldmaking were articulated in these four case studies, I will contextualize them by means of a broad overview of their political economies, the geographic distribution, and the protagonists who mobilized architecture from Eastern Europe.

Motivations and Geographies

Preceded by Soviet technical assistance to the People's Republic of China and elsewhere in Central and Southeast Asia, the presence of architects, planners, and contractors from socialist countries in West and North Africa and the Middle East followed decolonization and nationalist revolutions in these regions, as well as the Soviet opening to the Third World after the death of Stalin. This opening was welcomed by the first generation of leaders in independent African and Asian countries, who were wary of the United States, an ally of former colonial powers that had assigned the Global South an unfavorable position within the world market.¹⁴ These leaders were often intrigued by Soviet modernization programs. In spite of the similarities with, reflections of, and mutual borrowings from Western modernization theories and practice, the Soviet model of

development distinguished itself by its emphasis on state-centered industrialization and justice-oriented welfare distribution within the framework of a command economy.¹⁵

However, collaboration with the USSR and other socialist countries was also attractive to those African and Asian governments that did not follow the socialist model of development. Besides military and geopolitical concerns shared with the USSR, governments of many developing countries appreciated the favorable terms on which the socialist countries offered their technology, goods, and services. By the 1970s socialist countries increasingly abandoned trade policies based on anti-imperialist solidarity and saw the Global South as a reservoir of raw materials and mobile labor.¹⁶ Yet governments of several Asian and African countries continued to welcome Eastern Europeans as a means to stimulate economic competition between foreign investors. Another incentive to work with Eastern Europe were the notorious shortages in the professional workforce in West Africa and the Middle East that the socialist countries offered to fill.

The incentives for West African and Middle Eastern actors to collaborate with socialist countries were matched by a set of ideological aims, geopolitical objectives, and economic and industrial policy interests of the USSR and its satellites.¹⁷ The shifts in foreign and economic policies were largely reflected in the trajectories of architectural transfers and their volumes, from a few, highly visible buildings donated by the Soviets under Nikita Khrushchev to a much more numerous production bartered by Soviet satellites according to the principle of “mutual advantage” under Leonid Brezhnev, even if the latter perpetuated the ambiguous relationship between aid and trade that characterized Khrushchev’s “buildings-gifts.” Geopolitical objectives and economic pressures in particular countries often differentiated the periodization of their architectural engagements abroad. For instance, assistance granted during the 1960s to developing countries by East Germany (GDR) in an attempt at subverting West Germany’s Hallstein Doctrine was followed by the GDR’s more economically oriented export policies in the following decade, when this doctrine was gradually abandoned.

In particular, the oil embargo of 1973 was a game changer, as the profits of Arab governments deposited in Western financial institutions were lent to socialist countries intent on modernizing their economies and financing their models of consumer societies. Yet the industrial leap that would have allowed them to pay back their debt never materialized, and Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and other socialist countries responded by boosting their exports in other areas, including design and construction.¹⁸ For architects, planners, and managers of construction companies from non-Soviet socialist countries, this “kiss of debt” meant greater pressure from state leaderships to secure convertible currency that made them highly accommodating to the demands of their Middle Eastern and North African clients and led to a surge of their engagements in these regions. By contrast,

export of design services did not play a comparable role in the foreign trade of the Soviets, who were able from the 1960s onward to obtain convertible currency by exporting fossil fuels to Western Europe.¹⁹ There is also archival evidence showing that at least some governments (such as Libya) were wary of Soviet influence and preferred to trade with other Eastern European countries (such as Romania).

With these shifts in geography and in the motivations underlying architectural mobilities, the relationships between the architectures produced and the socialist project likewise changed. For instance, Soviet designs of two housing neighborhoods in Ghana were intended to be instrumental for the socialist modernization of the country.²⁰ Within a general vision of egalitarian welfare distribution, these neighborhoods featured nurseries, kindergartens, and canteens preparing precooked food, with the explicit aim of releasing women from domestic work and allowing their entrance into wage labor. The construction of these (unrealized) neighborhoods would have required a fundamental change in the Ghanaian construction industry to bring it in line with the Soviet model. Architecture under Nkrumah was also promoted in the Ghanaian mass media as a signifier of what a socialist everyday life could mean, thus staking out a field of debate that was relevant and meaningful for actors on the ground. However, West African and Middle Eastern architects, state authorities, intellectuals, and journalists also proposed other meanings for this architecture, including national identity and cultural emancipation. By the final decades of the Cold War, such readings had been embraced by Eastern European actors in Nigeria, Iraq, and the Gulf, and they often omitted any reference to socialism.

In contrast to these changing readings of architecture coproduced by Eastern Europeans, West Africans, and Middle Easterners, this production was consistently conditioned by the political economy of state socialism. All four case studies show that this political economy—governed by such principles as state monopoly on foreign trade, barter transactions, and the inconvertibility of Eastern European currencies—offered opportunities for and imposed constraints on the employment of distinct design procedures, research approaches, construction technologies, and construction materials. For example, barter agreements resulted in the Romanian practice of redrawing plans provided by the commissioners in African and Asian oil-producing countries to maximize the use of construction materials, technologies, and labor, which Romania bartered for crude oil. Another example may be found in the minutes of the negotiations regarding the contract for Baghdad's master plans by Poland's Miastoprojekt (1967, 1973). These minutes show how Polish negotiators exploited the inconvertibility of the Polish currency to offer a larger and more comprehensive team than their Western competitors could match. This team, working closely with the municipality of Baghdad, produced a plan that was survey-based, interdisciplinary, and collaborative. While there was nothing intrinsically anticapitalist about these

features, they contrasted with the work of other actors on the ground, including the previous, British-delivered master plan of Baghdad (1956).²¹

Vessels of Architectural Resources

Three principal types of actors were mobilized as vessels of architectural resources from socialist countries. Besides large, state design institutes, they included state contractors offering design-and-build services and individual professionals directly hired by institutions abroad. All three answered to and collaborated with a wide network of other institutions in Eastern Europe, including ministries in charge of foreign trade, foreign affairs, construction, and others; Communist parties and their dependent organizations; foreign trade organizations (FTOs); research, training, and scientific institutions; trade unions; youth, women, and other mass organizations; producers of construction materials, equipment, and machinery; and cultural and sport organizations.²²

As a result of the state monopoly on foreign trade in socialism, the activities of individual and institutional actors were mediated by FTOs; by the end of the Cold War, as attempts at “market socialism” were made in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, several contractors had obtained prerogatives previously reserved for FTOs. They sometimes recruited experts from the industry and from scientific institutes, including newly emerging research centers specializing in “tropical architecture” and planning in developing countries, such as the International Postgraduate Course of Urban and Regional Planning for Developing Countries in Szczecin (Poland) and the Institute of Tropical Architecture in Gdańsk (Poland). Research in tropical construction was carried out also at the Architecture and Civil Engineering University in Weimar (GDR) and at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University in Moscow. The capacity to recruit scholars from institutions such as these and, occasionally, their African and Asian graduates who had studied on scholarships granted by Eastern European governments, was presented to developing countries as a major advantage of a socialist planned economy.²³

State design institutes that were closely monitored by, and sometimes directly connected to, particular ministries played the central role in delivering planning documentation and architectural designs to foreign countries. Many of them were in charge of large-scale projects, and so the Soviet Union’s Gostroiproekt (Institute for Town Construction Projects) and its predecessors and cooperators were responsible for master plans of cities in Cuba (Havana, 1960s), Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar, 1954, 1963, 1971), Afghanistan (Kabul, 1964), and Iran (Fuladshahr, 1968), as well as city districts elsewhere.²⁴ Planning offices from other socialist countries delivered master plans for Conakry (Zagreb Urban Planning Institute, 1963), the Tripolitania region in Libya and its individual cities

(Wadeco from Poland, 1983), and Tunisia's tourist development (Czechoslovak Institute of Regional Planning, 1966), among many others.²⁵ The projects delivered abroad reflected the particular specializations of architectural institutions, with Soviet Giproiniizdrav, Giprovuz, and Giprostroiindustriia responsible for hospitals, university buildings, and prefabricated housing respectively. Yet from the 1970s, design institutes would often extend their areas of responsibility when working abroad; for example, the commissions of Hungary's Design Institute for Public Buildings (Közti) in Arab countries included not only medical, educational, and sports facilities but also housing neighborhoods.²⁶

Most architectural exports from socialist countries were conveyed by two other types of actors. First, they included contractors who offered both design and construction services combined in one package. These companies had often been established during the postwar reconstruction period and put in charge of large-scale industrial works and civil engineering infrastructure; such tasks also dominated their export activities. This genealogy was sometimes reflected in their names. Consider, for example, Energoprojekt (EP) of Yugoslavia (Serbia), created in 1951 to provide design and consultancy services within hydro- and thermal power generation and water management. Other companies included Yugoslavia's Ivan Milutinović (PIM) and RAD from Serbia as well as Ingra from Croatia and Beton from Macedonia; Bulgaria's Technoexportstroy (TES); and Arcom and Romproiect from Romania. The design-and-build procedure that they offered had been often favored by West and North African and Middle Eastern governments, and it resulted in such highly visible projects as the National Arts Theatre (Stefan Kolchev for TES, 1977) and the International Trade Fair (Zoran Bojović for EP, 1977) both in Lagos, Nigeria; as well as the Sudanese parliament building in Khartoum (Cezar Lăzărescu and for the Design Institute Carpați, 1972–78).²⁷ Sometimes, commissions abroad for these actors were restricted to design tasks (Administration Center Hamma designed in Algiers by TES's Dimitar Bogdanov, 1987) or to construction (Ministries Complex built in Kuwait City by EP, 1981). In design-and-build commissions, EP, TES, and Romproiect lowered their costs by employing workers from their home countries and by producing building materials and components in factories set up near construction sites or in regional bases in North and West Africa and the Middle East.

The second type of actor common in many non-Soviet countries were individual professionals, directly employed by planning institutions, universities, authorities, and sometimes private offices in developing countries. For example, in the 1970s Polish planners and sociologists were hired by Comedor (Comité permanent d'études, de développement, d'organisation et d'aménagement de l'agglomération d'Alger), the body responsible for the master planning of Algiers.²⁸ Around the same time, a group of Romanian architects employed in Algeria as designers and educators at the University of Constantine shaped its architectural

program according to the curriculum of the Ion Mincu University of Architecture in Bucharest. Such contracts with individual architects typically involved four signatories: the professionals in question, their home employer, their prospective employer abroad, and an FTO from the professionals' home country specialized in the export of labor (for instance, Limex in GDR, Polservice in Poland, Romconsult in Romania, or Polytechna in Czechoslovakia).

The motivations of Eastern Europeans for securing a contract abroad included professional ambition and the opportunity to practice architecture unhampered by the constraints imposed by party bureaucrats and state construction companies. The chance to travel, rare in most socialist countries, and to earn more than at home, were important incentives too. Professionals circulating in state-socialist networks sometimes branched out to other ones, including those of the United Nations, another mobilizer of architectural expertise from Eastern Europe.²⁹ For example, Croatian planner Vladimir Antolić was responsible for urban plans in Burma, Indonesia, and Malaysia as a UN expert (1953–63);³⁰ and among the collaborators of UN-Habitat was Soviet planner Anatolii Nikolaevich Rimsha, the codesigner of the Kabul master plan and professor at Patrice Lumumba University.³¹

Eastern European architects and planners working abroad for public institutions would have only a handful of colleagues from the West. Even when Western professionals sought opportunities in oil-producing countries in North Africa and the Middle East (which boomed after the 1973 embargo in difference to the economic crisis in Western Europe and the United States), they were typically operating from their headquarters, with brief local visits. By contrast, the lower fees requested by Eastern European FTOs allowed high-profile architects and planners from socialist countries longer periods of deployment, either in a branch office or in local institutions.³² Whatever dissatisfaction this practice may have created among these professionals, it also facilitated design methodologies that engaged closely with the conditions on the ground, as in the case of extensive land-use surveys prepared for the master plans of Baghdad by Miastoprojekt or lightweight prefabricated systems fine-tuned by Miastoprojekt for the Iraqi construction industry.³³

The focus on these actors shows the many forms assumed by architectural labor abroad. It was a fungible resource, whose export from Eastern Europe was defined by political-economic concerns; a technological expertise whose transfers were informed by concerns about stabilization and the reproduction of the expected performance; and a cultural competence translated into new contexts.³⁴ Each of these modalities of export, transfer, and translation applied to many, but not necessarily all, instances of architectural labor, and what could not be exported might well be translated. But this labor was also a lived, everyday experience from within which new collective subjectivities emerged and global visions of solidarity were tested, and, on occasion, challenged.

By studying the many forms assumed by architectural labor, this research takes its cue from architectural and planning history, global history, comparative urban studies, and science and technology studies. At the same time, the account of the various modalities of this labor (design, administration, supervision, research, and education) leads to a broader understanding of architecture beyond its manifestation in individual buildings. It brings to the fore actors that have largely been ignored by architectural historians, such as municipal planning institutions in Africa and Asia and foreign trade organizations from Eastern Europe. Such a reading of Eastern European architecture does not privilege “Central Europe” (Germany and the post-Habsburg space), which has been the focus of most architectural histories of the region. Rather, it pays attention to countries less discussed and yet deeply involved in urbanization processes in North Africa and the Middle East, such as Bulgaria and Romania.

Specialization, Cooperation, and Competition

During their work in West and North Africa and the Middle East, actors from socialist countries contributed to programs of industrialization and welfare distribution pursued by postindependence governments, with typical tasks including industrial plants, housing, and medical, educational, sports, and cultural facilities. These programs were sometimes explained by government officials in terms of socialist modernization (more often than not qualified as “African” or “Arab” socialism), and actors from Eastern Europe in charge of these projects drew on their experience of postwar, state-led reconstruction and development. At the same time, they were eager to argue the specificity of their national experience and competence, with Bulgarians promoting their tourist architecture at the Black Sea, Poles showcasing the reconstruction of Warsaw, and East Germans drawing attention to the merits of the “complex” (i.e., comprehensive) system of industrialized construction in the GDR.

These aspirations did not always coincide with attempts at specialization promoted by the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), which aimed at a “socialist international division of labor” as the basis of intersocialist economic integration.³⁵ Remits from Comecon agreements were sometimes extended to export activities, with Polish sugar plants built not only in member states but also around the Mediterranean and elsewhere; and Comecon’s Permanent Commission for Construction coordinated technical assistance in architecture and construction to Comecon’s least developed members, such as Mongolia.³⁶ However, there is little evidence of coordination among Comecon countries in commercial commissions in the Middle East and North Africa. Rather, by the 1970s many non-Soviet design institutes and state contractors found themselves

competing against each other in open tenders organized by local governments, often setting aside their original institutional reimits.

This does not mean that specific experiences of Eastern European architecture, planning, and construction were irrelevant to engagements abroad. Yet, rather than ready-made and available for export, these experiences need to be seen as actualized and reshaped when mobilized abroad. For instance, so-called type designs—designs constructed in various locations with small, if any, modifications—were privileged in export from socialist countries, above all from Romania. This was the case not only because these designs had dominated the country's architectural practice since the Second World War, but also because they proved to be a useful tool to coordinate the production of Romanian construction materials applied in buildings bartered for crude oil. The actors from the South were often decisive in shaping patterns of division of labor among Eastern European countries, for example, by soliciting engagement in a specific industry or by requesting that the scholarships offered to their students by a particular socialist country were assigned to a specific discipline.

Socialist Networks and Global Urbanization

The embedded character of the labor of architects from socialist countries means that their work needs to be understood from within their competition and collaboration with various local partners and with actors circulating in other networks. They included regional networks (for instance of Egyptian and Palestinian professionals in Cold War Middle East); those of other socialist countries; western European and North American; and emerging new actors (for instance, South and Southeast Asian contractors in the 1970s and 1980s Gulf). The need to account for these interactions in the framework of this research project resulted in a wide-ranging investigation conducted in public and private archives in West Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, as well as in the United Kingdom and the United States. The variety of engagements of architects from socialist countries abroad meant an extension of the investigation beyond architectural archives and toward, for instance, systematic enquiries into full runs of local newspapers, while the lived character of architectural labor came to the fore in semistructured interviews with actors in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The four case studies summarized in what follows are based on this wide range of sources. They not only present a comparative perspective on the work of actors from various socialist countries but also offer glimpses into urbanization processes in Accra, Lagos, Baghdad, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait, thus contributing to their respective urban histories.

The first case study, focused on Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, argues that the claim to global applicability of the socialist model of development was



Fig. 7.1. Flagstaff House housing project, Accra, 1964. (GNCC, Vic Adegbite [chief architect], Charles Polónyi [project architect]. Photo by Łukasz Stanek, 2012.)

predicated on its adaptation to conditions outside the USSR, and that architecture, planning, and construction technology played a key role in this adaptation.³⁷ The reading of two Soviet large-scale housing designs in the cities of Accra and Tema shows how Soviet housing typologies, urban layouts, and prefabrication technologies were adapted to the climatic, social, and economic conditions of West Africa within the overarching attempt to industrialize Ghanaian construction. These projects, though never built, became a precedent for the mobility of Soviet architecture, planning, and construction to tropical regions around the world.

However, the Soviet Union did not dominate architectural production in Nkrumah's Ghana. Rather, the organization in charge of much of this production was the Ghana National Construction Corporation (GNCC), a state agency that was responsible for building and infrastructural programs. Besides being the local partner for the Soviet organizations, the majority of GNCC architects came from non-Soviet socialist countries, including Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. In this sense, while the work of the Soviets in Ghana was an instance of socialist multilateralism, in which nation-state organizations were the primary entity in architectural engagements, the GNCC may be viewed as an instance of socialist cosmopolitanism, an experience of an entangled transnational collaboration of Ghanaian actors with architects from various socialist countries.³⁸

The argument that the transfer of the socialist model of development did not exhaust the international engagements of architects, planners, and contractors from socialist countries is reinforced in the second case study. It focuses on Nigeria, a country whose anglophile elite did not follow the path of socialist modernization. The presence of Eastern Europeans in Nigeria during the 1960s and 1970s arose out of an attempt by the federal government to diversify the set of foreign actors working in the country. Socialist states accepted the invitation, since they were eager to benefit from Nigeria's oil boom.³⁹

Accordingly, rather than referring to a socialist model of development, Eastern European architects and planners who found themselves in Nigerian cities such as Lagos, Calabar, Zaria, and Jos, sought out ways of making sense of the tasks at hand. In particular, these architects pointed to analogies between the historical experiences of Eastern Europe and West Africa during the "long" nineteenth century. The argument that in both regions foreign domination by external empires resulted in economic backwardness and cultural dependency was part of state-socialist domestic propaganda and foreign diplomacy. But the protagonists of this case study referred to longer traditions of Eastern European architectural culture as useful precedents for confronting the tasks of economic modernization and cultural emancipation in Nigeria. Inspired by recent studies of the ways in which Africans deploy the city as a resource for operating at the level of the world, and how Asian cities reinvent urban norms that can count as "global," I call this practice the "worlding" of Eastern Europe.⁴⁰

Such worlding informed the Nigerian work of a number of architects and planners from socialist countries. For example, study of the master plan of the city of Calabar (1969), delivered by a Hungarian team led by architect Charles Polónyi, shows how the latter drew on his earlier experience of architecture and regional planning in rural areas of postwar Hungary, which he saw as "not very far from what we later called a Developing Country."⁴¹ Rural territories were also a preoccupation of Polish architect and scholar Zbigniew Dmochowski who studied vernacular building cultures in Nigeria by implementing drawing and survey techniques from prewar Poland to pave the way toward a "modern school of Nigerian architecture."⁴² Finally, the Yugoslav designers and builders of the International Trade Fair in Lagos by Energoprojekt (1977) embraced the peripheral position shared by Eastern Europe and West Africa as an opportunity to work across multiple worlds and to mobilize resources from various centers. While showing how the protagonists of this case study employed historical analogies between Eastern Europe and West Africa, their work also reveals the limits to these analogies, not least Eastern Europeans' own colonial fantasies and practices of "internal colonization."

The openings and blockages inherent in socialist foreign trade are the focus of the third case study. It addresses the urbanization of Baghdad within the world



Fig. 7.2. “Kadhemiyah Old Town,” 1967. (Miastoprojekt-Kraków, “Kadhemiyah Central District. Outlines for Detailed Plan. Short Report,” 1967. Private archive of Kazimierz Bajer, Kraków, Poland.)

socialist system. The core of the system was the Comecon, but the system also included affiliated countries, among them Iraq (since 1975). This case study shows how architects, planners, and contractors from Comecon countries advanced their work in Baghdad by instrumentalizing the differences between the emerging global market of design and construction services and the political economy of state socialism.

This political economy defined the conditions of labor for actors from socialist countries on the ground, and, in turn, it facilitated the technopolitics of their work in Iraq.⁴³ These dynamics can be seen as the master plans of Baghdad delivered by Miastoprojekt and its General Housing Programme for Iraq (1976–80); housing neighborhoods by Romania’s Arcom and Romproiect; infrastructure in Iraqi cities by Bulgarian, East German, and Soviet design institutes; public buildings by Yugoslav firms; and teaching curricula at the Department of Architecture in Baghdad to which architects from Czechoslovakia contributed.⁴⁴ The focus on collaboration and competition between actors from socialist countries in Iraq shows that their specific profiles resulted from path dependencies forged by economic instruments and political bargaining with their Iraqi counterparts.



Fig. 73. Main bus terminal, Abu Dhabi, 1980–91. (Bulgarproject, Kuno Dundakov, Stanka Dundakova [project architects]. Photo by Łukasz Stanek, 2015.)

The final case study starts with one of the most prominent buildings in Abu Dhabi (UAE): the Municipality and Town Planning Department. Designed by Bulgaria’s TES, it was constructed in 1985 by an Abu Dhabi–based contractor and a number of subcontractors from the region and elsewhere. This building, as well as others delivered by Eastern Europeans in the UAE and Kuwait during the last decade of the Cold War, differs from those discussed above. It did not result from intergovernmental agreements but from increasingly adamant attempts by state-socialist companies to enter foreign markets. In so doing, their managers left aside references to socialist internationalism and introduced themselves to prospective clients as carriers of technological expertise on a par with their Western competitors. Furthermore, the Abu Dhabi building broke with the tradition of modern architecture that characterized the foreign work of architects from socialist countries in the previous decades. Instead, it reflected the requirement of “Arab-Islamic culture,” formalized in the UAE and Kuwait by the late 1970s in response to the disenchantment with post-oil urbanization in the Gulf.

Such a combination of technological and cultural expertise was the precondition of the integration of Eastern European architects and contractors into the Western-dominated and increasingly globalized market of design and construction services in the Gulf.⁴⁵ This double expertise had been acquired by Eastern Europeans during their engagements in North Africa and the Middle East since



Fig. 7.4. Site C, Sabah Al-Salem, Kuwait, 1982. (Shiber Consult and INCO, Andrzej Bohdanowicz, Wojciech Jarząbek, Krzysztof Wiśniowski [project architects]. Photo by Łukasz Stanek, 2014.)

the 1960s. In the course of their work abroad, they had learned to comply with Western building norms, specification standards, financial regimes, technological systems, and construction management procedures; but they also became acquainted with the aesthetic and cultural proclivities of governmental clients in Arab countries. In so doing, they became agents of “socialist globalization,” understood not as an autarkic system but as an integration into the Western-dominated global economic order.⁴⁶ With the Gulf becoming one of the paradigmatic places of architecture’s globalization since the end of the twentieth century, this case study rewrites the genealogy of these processes by situating them within a longer history of socialist projects of worldwide solidarity.⁴⁷

Globalization by Weak Actors

The focus on Accra, Lagos, Baghdad, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait City shows how architects, planners, and contractors from Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the

Middle East practiced worldmaking. While studies of architectural transfers during the Cold War have typically been informed by the metaphor of a curtain, either iron or nylon, the conceptual framework of worldmaking offers a different image.⁴⁸ In this study, the Cold War appears as a clockwork mechanism in which the cogs of the antagonistic visions of global cooperation sometimes crash and grind and sometimes complement each other to a mutually productive effect.⁴⁹

What was produced was urbanization, and the results of these engagements continue to condition urbanization processes around the world. In West and North Africa and the Middle East, they include buildings and infrastructures, some of which have become a symbolically charged heritage of the decolonization processes. But they also include urban planning documents, building legislation, and teaching curricula still used by administrators, designers, contractors, and educators. Architectural mobilities affected urbanization in post-socialist Europe too. In particular, by the end of the Cold War, working abroad was a genuine learning experience for architects from stagnating Eastern European countries. The knowledge of modern building materials, technologies, functional programs, and construction management provided individual and institutional actors returning to Eastern Europe after 1989 with a competitive advantage, and so too did their familiarity with the architectural idiom of postmodernism, embraced by clients and the public after socialism.⁵⁰

This persisting entanglement of urbanization processes in West and North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe concerns also the persisting entanglement of their actors. When entering postsocialist countries, Western contractors sometimes reactivated their links with Eastern European architects and enterprises with whom they had worked in the Middle East and North Africa, while Middle Eastern developers invest in Eastern Europe, and Eastern European firms continue to operate in Middle Eastern and North African countries. These firms, now privatized, include EP, Wadeco, and TES; the latter typically works on middle-size contracts, while smaller contracts are operated by local firms, and larger ones are granted to Western companies. Eastern European architects who stayed in the Gulf after 1989 often occupy a similar middle ground on the labor market, expressed in the range of their salaries which are typically related to the passport of the employee.

The agency of these actors has been covered neither by architectural studies of star architects and “global” offices, nor by ethnographies of migrant workers and “inhabitants”—just as professionals and firms from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have been largely invisible to the scholarship on architectural globalization in spite of the key roles they have played in the urbanization of the Gulf and elsewhere. In the case of Eastern Europeans, their specific place in these processes has been path-dependent on their original placements by means of state-socialist networks during the Cold War. This placement concerned both

institutional entrance points, in public or private offices, but also the “weak” bargaining position of non-Soviet actors. As this research shows, such a weak position was typically shared by a state-socialist company under pressure to fulfill the compulsory “convertible currency plan” and by individual architects employed by a local planning agency for whom a dismissal would inhibit career prospects and deprive them of the opportunities that went with contracts abroad.⁵¹ This “weakness” was structural and hence independent of the personalities and abilities of the individuals involved, including such exceptionally skilled designers as Dimitar Bogdanov of TES or Zoran Bojović of EP. Yet it was precisely this “weakness” and its corollaries, such as flexibility and adaptability, that made these actors highly instrumental, and sometimes indispensable, within development road maps of local administrators, planners, and decision makers. This instrumentality resulted in an impact on urbanization processes around the world often far greater than that of powerful centers of the Cold War, thus constituting one of the most relevant legacies of twentieth-century socialism’s global visions.

Notes

1. This project was launched in 2009 at the Institute of History and Theory of Architecture (GTA), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH), and since then developed with the support of the Museum of Modern Art in Warsaw, the Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts (CASVA), National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC, and the Manchester Architecture Research Centre (MARC), University of Manchester. The results of this research will be presented in Łukasz Stanek, *Architecture in Global Socialism: Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the Middle East in the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming in 2020). For collected volumes on this theme, see Łukasz Stanek and Tom Avermaete, eds., “Cold War Transfer: Architecture and Planning from Socialist Countries in the ‘Third World,’” *The Journal of Architecture* (London) 17, no. 3 (2012); Łukasz Stanek, ed., “Socialist Networks and the Internationalization of Building Culture after 1945,” *ABE Journal* 6 (2014), published online on January 30, 2015, <https://journals.openedition.org/abe/1266>.

2. For a critique of the diffusionist model, see Jane M. Jacobs, “A Geography of Big Things,” *Cultural Geographies* 13, no. 1 (2006): 1–27.

3. Ryszard Kapuściński, *Heban* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1998), 138.

4. See, for instance, Patsy Healey and Robert Upton, eds., *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices* (London: Routledge, 2010); Jeffrey W. Cody, *Exporting American Architecture, 1870–2000* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Donald McNeill, *The Global Architect: Firms, Fame and Urban Form* (New York: Routledge, 2009); for overview, see Stanek, “Socialist Networks.”

5. McNeill, *Global Architect*, 1.

6. Harald Möller, *DDR und Dritte Welt: Die Beziehungen der DDR mit Entwicklungsländern, ein neues theoretisches Konzept, dargestellt anhand der Beispiele China und Äthiopien sowie Irak/ Iran* (Berlin: Köster, 2004), 4.

7. According to the US-based Engineering News Report (ENR), see “Energoprojekt, 60 Years of Success,” (Belgrade: Energoprojekt, 2011), 32, 38.

8. “Sovetskaia arkhitektura za rubezhom,” *Arkhitektura SSSR* 6 (1984): 109; Cole Roskam, “Non-Aligned Architecture: China’s Designs on and in Ghana and Guinea, 1955–92,” *Architectural History* 58 (2015): 261–291; Guanghui Ding and Charlie Q. L. Xue, “China’s Architectural Aid: Exporting a Transformational Modernism,” *Habitat International* 47 (2015): 136–147; Urbanistički institut, “Conakry: Plan directeur d’urbanisme” (Zagreb, 1963).

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12. Stuart Elden, “Mondialisation before Globalisation: Lefebvre and Axelos,” in *Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre*, eds. Kanishka Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgrom, and Christian Schmid (New York: Routledge, 2008), 80–93.

13. Silvio Pons, *The Global Revolution: A History of International Communism 1917–1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

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15. David Engerman, “The Second World’s Third World,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (2011): 183–212.

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18. Stephen Kotkin, “The Kiss of Debt: The East Bloc Goes Borrowing,” in *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, eds. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel S. Sargent (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 80–93.

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21. Łukasz Stanek, “Miastoprojekt Goes Abroad: Transfer of Architectural Labor from Socialist Poland to Iraq (1958–1989),” *Journal of Architecture* 17, no. 3 (2012): 361–386.

22. Andreas Butter, “Showcase and Window to the World: East German Architecture Abroad 1949–1990,” *Planning Perspectives* 33, no. 2 (2018): 249–269, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02665433.2017.1348969>.

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24. Kaftanov, “From International Architecture.”

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26. András Ferkai, ed., *KÖZTI 66. Egy tervezőiroda története (1949–1991)* (Budapest: Vince Kiadó, 2015), 2 vols.

27. "35 godina arhitekture Energoprojekta," Energoprojekt Archive, Belgrade (Serbia); "Technoexportstroy," catalog, no date (1980s), Technoexportstroy Archive, Sofia (Bulgaria); "S.C. Romproiect S.A.," catalogue, no date (2000s), Romproiect Archive, Bucharest (Romania).

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29. Bogdan Wyporek, *Daleko od Warszawy: architektka zapiski z trzech kontynentów* (Warsaw: Akapit, 2009); Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher, and Hans-Georg Schleicher, eds., *Die DDR und Afrika. Zwischen Klassenkampf und neuem Denken* (Münster: Lit, 1993).

30. Mojca Smode Cvitanović and Marina Smokvina, "Hrvatski arhitekti i urbanisti u zemljama Trećega svijeta/ Croatian architects and urban planners in Third World countries," *Razvojna suradnja kroz nasljeđe Pokreta Nesvrstanih/ Development cooperation through the legacy of the nonaligned movement* (Zagreb: Croatian Platform for International Citizen Solidarity, 2015), 83–96.

31. Anatolii Nikolaevich Rimsha, *Gorod i zharkij klimat* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1975).

32. By contrast, industrial facilities from socialist countries were sometimes chosen by local authorities in spite of the fact that they were not the cheapest ones on offer. They were favored because Eastern European companies offered to train local staff and to use local resources. Technological compatibilities and path dependencies were another reason to choose Eastern European deliveries, which were often part of larger barter agreements.

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35. Sara Lorenzini, "Comecon and the South in the Years of Détente: A Study on East–South Economic Relations," *European Review of History* 21, no. 2 (2014): 183–199.

36. Gerhard Kraft, *Die Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedsländer des RWG auf dem Gebiet der Investitionen* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1977); "Einheitliche technische Bedingungen für die Projektierung von Betrieben und anderen Objekten, die in der Mongolischen Volksrepublik mit technischer Hilfe der Mitgliedsländer des RGW errichtet werden" (Berlin: Bauakademie der DDR, 1976).

37. Łukasz Stanek, "Architects from Socialist Countries in Ghana (1957–1967): Modern Architecture and Mondialisation," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 74, no. 4 (December 2015): 416–442.

38. For the distinction between socialist multilateralism and socialist cosmopolitanism, see Quinn Slobodian, "The Uses of Disorientation: Socialist Cosmopolitanism in an Unfinished DEFA-China Documentary," in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2017), 222.

39. The military support obtained by the federal government from the Soviet Union and some of its satellites during the civil war (1967–70) was an important gate opener to Nigeria for several state-socialist contractors.

40. AbdouMaliq Simone, “On the Worlding of African Cities,” *African Studies Review* 44, no. 2 (2001): 15–41; Aihwa Ong, “Worlding Cities, or the Art of Being Global,” in *Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global*, eds. Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 1–26.

41. Charles Polónyi, *An Architect-Planner on the Peripheries: The Retrospective Diary of Charles K. Polónyi* (Budapest: Műszaki Könyvkiadó, 2000), 12.

42. Zbigniew Dmochowski, *An Introduction to Nigerian Traditional Architecture* (London: Ethnographica; Lagos: National Commission for Museums and Monuments, 1990), vol. 1, ix.

43. For the concept of technopolitics, see Gabrielle Hecht, ed., *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).

44. Stanek, “Miastoprojekt”; “Technoexportstroy,” catalogue (n.d.), TES Archive, Sofia (Bulgaria); “S.C. Romproiect S.A.,” catalogue (n.d.), Romproiect Archive, Bucharest (Romania); Života Perišić et al., *Gradevinarstvo Srbije* (Belgrade: Ministarstvo građevina Srbije, 1997).

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46. Łukasz Stanek, *Postmodernism Is Almost All Right: Polish Architecture after Socialist Globalisation* (Warsaw: Fundacja Bęc-Zmiana, 2012).

47. Łukasz Stanek, “Mobilities of Architecture in the Global Cold War: From Socialist Poland to Kuwait and Back,” *International Journal of Islamic Architecture* 4, no. 2 (2015): 365–398; Stanek, *Postmodernism*.

48. Ákos Moravánszky et al., eds., *East West Central: Re-building Europe 1950–1990* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2017), 3 vols.

49. I owe this comment to a conversation with Quinn Slobodian, Hong Kong, March 2017.

50. Stanek, *Postmodernism*.

51. See also Dana Vais, “Exporting Hard Modernity: Construction Projects from Ceaușescu’s Romania in the “Third World,”” *Journal of Architecture* 17, no. 3 (2012): 438.

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